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 A Mobil Ad hoc Network (MANET) is a wireless multi-hop network with 
various mobile, self-organized and wireless infrastructure nodes. MANET 
characteristics such as openness restricted resources and decentralization 
impact node efficiency and made them easy to be affected by various 
security attacks, especially Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. 
The goal of this research is to implement a simulation model called DDoS 
Attack Simulation Model (DDoSM) in Network Simulator 2(NS-2) and to 
examine the effect of DDoS Attack on various routing protocol types in 
MANET namely: Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP), Ad hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) protocol and Location-Aided Routing (LAR) 
protocol. The introduced model uses the NS-2 simulator to apply DDoS on 
the three chosen routing protocols. In terms of throughput and end-to-end 
latency under the consequences of the attack, the performance of three 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is a series of mobile nodes that are distributed via wireless 
multi-hop technology [1]. Each node can act as a router on its own in an infrastructure-free way to provide 
the network functionality necessary [2, 3]. The MANET can be used in various fields, including military 
applications, sensor environments, rescue operations [4]. MANET has special features such as dynamic 
topology, which implies that nodes frequently change mobility, which compromises network security [5].  
It is, therefore vulnerable to various attacks such as flooding attacks that deliberately send ample traffic 
packets to interrupt the efficiency of the network [6, 7].  
Securing MANET is a critical research issue; it is vulnerable to many types of attacks and interferes 
with network security characteristics. One of the threatening attacks MANET is the Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attack [7-12]. The DDoS attacker has hundreds or thousands of useless packets flooding 
the victim's resources to make the network busy or out of service. This will reduce the capacity of 
the network and render it unable to perform its role. It thus becomes incapable of providing services to 
the legitimate nodes. 
We deployed a DDoS network attack in the NS-2 simulator in this study, and it is called  
the distributed Denial of Service protocol (DDoSM). DDOSM uses the NS-2 traffic generator to produce 
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a stream of Constant Bit Rate (CBR) traffic, a feature that does not exist in actual networks but is used for 
simulation purposes of testing the most sensitive and efficient routing protocols under the attack effect 
without affecting network performance. The DDoSM model will be incorporated into three types of routing 
protocols: Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [13] which is a hybrid routing protocol, Ad-hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) [14] which is a reactive routing protocol, and Location-Aided Routing (LAR) [15] 
which is an aided routing protocol to geographic position. The DDoSM model performs flooding attacks on 
these routing protocols and then analyzes resistance to DDoS attack by each of these routing protocols and 
this can be useful for maintaining a MANET. 
The remainder of the article is structured accordingly. We provide an overview of the research 
background and work related to it in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the theoretical simulation model, 
simulation environment and performance metric for the DDoS attack. Section 4 addresses the results and 
evaluations and we summarize our research and  future work in Section 5. 
 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
2.1.   Mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) 
MANET is a type of wireless network that does not have a central base station to spread nodes.  
As shown in Figure 1, When two nodes have to communicate with each other, they have to be within each 
other's range and have to rely on other nodes for communication. MANET is easily set up in locations that do 
not embrace the existence of wired networks for a short time span. It may be helpful in war or natural disaster 
situations. However, due to the lack of networks and cables, MANET has several advantageous benefits such 
as low budget and effortless operation, and because it has a quick implementation with setup for the same 





Figure 1. Mobile ad-hoc network 
 
 
2.2.   Routing in MANET 
Routing is when each node has to find paths to transfer data packets between computing devices in 
the network. Routing in MANET is a major challenge because the topology is temporary and dynamic.  
This section reviews our study into the three chosen routing protocols. 
 
2.2.1.   Location-aided routing (LAR) protocol 
LAR is one of the common routing protocols which seeks to reduce the overhead control 
message [15, 16]. In order to identify a potential target node location, LAR utilizes the Global Positioning 
System (GPS). LAR determines a portion of the network which is experiencing limited flooding on the basis 
of that knowledge. So, the amount of control messages passing through the network declines during the route 
discovery process. LAR assumes that the network nodes know their own location and the last known location 
of the destination node. On this basis, LAR links the search area of the route to the region in which the route 
to the destination node is located. 
LAR adjusts the mechanism of path discovery so that only the nodes that are part of the search area 
will retransmit route request packets. When the route request packet reaches the intermediate node, the node 
first determines whether the request packet for the incoming route falls into the search zone specified. If not, 
the route data package should be transmitted, unless it is part of the search area. If not, the packet will 
be discarded. 
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As the Figure 2 shows, if nodes I and K receive a route request for destination node D from node S, 
the route request is sent because both I and K are within rectangular request range. The path request will be 
sent. By comparison, if the route request is received by the node N, the request is ignored because N is 





Figure 2. LAR routing protocol [15] 
 
 
2.2.2.   Ad-hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) protocol 
This work adopts the AODV routing protocol [17, 18]. AODV is a powerful, self-starting,  
large-scale routing protocol. Over many years it has been extensively studied and developed, there by 
confirming its robustness and advantages. As shown in Figure 3(a), AODV's route discovery process was 
accompanied by the source node transmits a route request (RREQ) packet to all MANET nodes.The RREQ 
packet contains information on routing, including the IP address of the originator, ID of transmission and 
sequence number of the recipient. Every intermediate node receives the RREQ packet and retains the reverse 
path towards the source node. The intermediate node verifies that an RREQ packet with the same IP address 
and transmitted ID has already been provided, and then decides whether an RREQ packet is to be refused 
or admitted. 
This verification process helps prevent attacks from floods. The intermediate node will validate  
the destination sequence number contained in its routing list after processing the RREQ packet.  
The intermediate node uni-casts the Route Response (RREP) packet to the source node if the sequence 
number is greater than or equal to the one found in the RREQ packet. If there is no fresh-styled route to  
the destination node, the RREQ packet must retain its Navigation until the target node is reached,  








Figure 3. AODV routing protocol. S: source node, D: destination node, N1 to N5 intermediate nodes,  
(a) RREQ packet propagation, (b) Path of the RREP packet [19] 
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2.2.3. Zone routing protocol (ZRP) 
ZRP is a hybrid routing protocol. The main idea of this hybrid protocol is to use both the proactive 
and reactive protocol routing mechanisms [20]. ZRP is based on the zone concept. A zone's nodes are broken 
down into outer nodes and inner nodes. Outer nodes are connected nodes directly, and the inner nodes are 
connected nodes indirectly. The routing zone is represented in hops with a radius ρ. If ρ=1 implies, the source 
only goes to its direct link nodes. If ρ=2 the source could go further. 
Since most communication takes place in ZRP between the nodes near to each other, ZRP uses 
proactive protocols to discover the routing information within the zone. This is known as the IARP  
(Intra-Zone Routing Protocol). The reactive protocols are used to discover the routes between zones. This is 
named IERP (Interzone Routing Protocol) [21]. 
Consider the network found in Figure 4(a). The S node has a packet that must be sent to X.  
The scale of the zone is = 2 radius. The node uses IARP's routing table to check if the destination lies 
within its zone. A route request is given using IERP because it is not identified. The message is transmitted to 
the outward nodes (the figure shows a gray color). Each check-in their routing table for the destination. Node 
I cannot find the destination in its routing table. It, therefore, broadcasts the message to its outward nodes,  
as shown in Figure 4(b) in gray color. The request is not passed back to the nodes D, F and S because of 
query control mechanisms. 
Lastly, node T receives a request to locate the destination in its routing zone, as illustrated in  
Figure 4(c). Node T adds the path from node X itself to the route request. A route reply with the reversed 
direction is generated and returned to the source node. If there were many routes to the destination,  
several replies would be provided to the source. 
 
 
   
(a)  (b)  (c)  
 
Figure 4. ZRP routing protocol, (a) routing zone of node S, (b) routing zone of node I,  
(c) routing zone of node T [13] 
 
 
2.3.   Related work  
To our best knowledge, no one has conducted a comparative study of the three routing protocols 
chosen up to now: AODV, ZRP, and LAR under the DDoS attack [10]. In [22], the authors have examined 
the performance analysis of four AODV routing protocols, dynamic source routing (DSR),  
destination-sequenced distance-vector routing (DSDV), and the optimized link state routing protocol 
(OLSR). Then they concluded the implementation of these protocols under greyhole attacks [23] and 
blackhole attacks [24, 25] would suffer an efficiency degradation compared to normal situations. 
In [26], the author presented a performance evaluation survey for the routing protocols AODV and 
temporary ordered routing algorithm (TORA) for various performance parameters under DDoS attack. 
The simulation had only been implemented for 11 nodes. The results of this experiment showed that AODV 
performs better than TORA. 
In [2], the authors inspected the number of malicious nodes increases with various reactive routing 
protocols during the flood attack; the overall network performance decreases. During their work, the authors 
discussed many performance metrics such as the ratio of packet transmission, jitter, and throughput.  
The result was that AODV performs best under flood attack. 
In [27], the authors evaluated the performance of AODV and secure ad-hoc on-demand vector 
routing (SAODV) under blackhole, greyhole, selfish and flooding routing protocols [28, 29]. They perceive 
that the SAODV, which is an AODV extension designed to achieve the security features in the routing 
messages, it has better performance under blackhole, greyhole and selfish attacks. In comparison,  
under the flooding attack, the AODV has superior efficiency. The author also found that the network's effect 
of flooding and blackhole attacks is greater than that of other attacks.   
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In [30], the author investigated the effect of the Resource Consumption Attack (RCA) on MANET 
performance, particularly the AODV protocol. This concentrated on how the number of attackers and their 
location would influence the packet delivery ratio and jitter delay. The results of the study may help other 
researchers propose solutions that could reduce the impact of RCA. 
 
 
3. DDOS ATTACK SIMULATION MODEL (DDOSM) 
Figure 5 demonstrates the architecture of DDoSM, the layout is extended to the three routing 
protocols of choice, namely ZRP, AODV, and LAR. When a regular link begins using CBR traffic, it sends 
out a stream of flooding packets to overload the destination. The study simulations were constructed using 
NS-2 to evaluate the effectiveness of the DDoS attack, and the simulation findings were collected from two 
experimental scenarios. The first scenario as shown in Figure 6 was applied by varying one factor which is 
the number of attackers (3, 6 and 9), all attackers have a radio range of 250 m. and the attackers were placed 
near the destination where they could exhaust their limited received window which in the worst case leads to 










Figure 6. Network topology for scenario I 
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The second scenario as shown in Figure 7 carries out the results by varying the radio range (300, 
350 and 400 m), whereas the number of attackers is 3. Using a traffic load of 2 packets/s, the CBR 
connection starts from 2 s until the simulation ends. The attackers target the CBR connection in both cases by 
using a flood rate equal to 50 packets/s and the size of the packets is 1000 bytes and the attacker begins 





Figure 7. Network topology for scenario II 
 
 
Table 1. Simulation parameters 
Parameter Value 
Network area 1000m x 1000m 
No. of nodes 50 
Node speed 0 – 7 m/s 
Bandwidth 11 mbps 
Traffic Packet size 512 bytes 
Packet rate 2 packets per second 
Traffic type CBR 
Flood interval 0.02 s 
Flood rate 50 packets per second 
Mobility model Random waypoint 
Antenna model Omnidirectional 
Propagation model Two-ray ground 
Period of emulation 100 s 
 
 
The research focused on each routing protocol; under the DDoS attack, two performance metrics 
were calculated. 
a. Throughput 
Throughput is the number of bits per unit of time at the destination. In each experimental outcome, 
this represents the sum of the destinations throughput values. 
b. End-to-end delay 
It is the time between the first bit of a packet being sent by the source and the end bit of the packet 
being sent by the destination side. In each experiment, the average time is recorded for the destination 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1.   Experimental results for the scenario I 
Flooding CBR traffic affects MANET, where overwhelmed traffic is sent to the destination, creates 
congestion in the usual route resulting in the data packet falling as a result, affecting the network 
performance metrics. The experimental results in Figure 8 demonstrate that the network throughput declines 
when there is an increased number of attackers. If put near the destination, DDoSM will create this difference 
under 3, 6, and 9 attackers. ZRP decreases network throughput by around 42.1 percent compared to  
the normal situation (zero attackers) when 3 attackers are added. In the case of LAR, it reduces network 
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throughput by 51.5 percent. AODV's efficiency is poorer than other protocols because it eliminates network 
communication by 57.4%. ZRP reduces network throughput by around 49.1 percent compared to the normal 
scenario (zero attackers) in the case of 6 attackers applied. In the case of LAR, it reduces network throughput 
by 56.3 percent. AODV's performance is lower than other protocols because it reduces network throughput 
by 61.7%. In the worst case of this experiment, as implemented by 9 attackers, ZRP reduces network 
throughput by about 57.1 percent compared to the normal (zero attackers) situation. In the case of LAR,  
it reduces network throughput by 62.8 percent. AODV's efficiency is poorer than other protocols because it 
eliminates network communication by 67.3%. As noted in Figure 8, the impact of the attack is directly 
proportional to the number of attackers, as a result, it is assumed that if the number of attackers reaches more 
than 10, the network could crash because of the number of attackers is 3, the performance in LAR and 
AODV dropped to half the normal scenario for each protocol and the performance of 9 attackers continues 
to decrease. Figure 9 shows the effects of the attack on the end-to-end delay compared to the number of 
attackers, AODV has the largest effect compared to other protocols where, in the case of 9 attackers,  
the delay increases by around 98.71% and in the case of LAR and ZRP, the delay increases by 97.1% and 





Figure 8. Throughput vs number of attackers 
 
 
Figure 9. Delay vs number of attackers 
 
 
4.2.   Experimental results for scenario II  
The simulation results of scenario II demonstrate the effect of varying the attacker's radio range 
under the performance metrics (throughput and end-to-end delay), the radio range specifies the maximum 
distance a node can send its data. Increasing the radio range leads to decreasing the network throughput and 
increasing the end-to-end delay. In scenario II, the number of attackers is 3 and the flooding rate is  
50 packets/s. The focus was on varying the radio range and observing its impact on the three routing 
protocols, it can be seen from the Figure 10, ZRP shows a slight decrease in network throughput while LAR 
shows an average dropping in throughput, however, AODV shows the worst performance under all ranges. 
Figure 11 depicts the effect of different radio range on the end-to-end delay, AODV has the highest delay 





Figure 10. Throughput vs radio range 
 
 
Figure 11. Delay vs radio range 
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5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This research analyzed three types of routing protocols in MANET and implemented a DDoSM 
using CBR traffic flooding. DDoS has been deployed using the NS2 emulator in the routing protocols 
AODV, ZRP and LAR. Additionally, the efficiency of routing protocols was analyzed using performance 
parameters of the throughput and end-to-end delay. Finally, the assessment and analysis effects of  
the protocols were presented. In both scenarios, ZRP worked best in terms of throughput and end-to-end 
delay and exhibited the most resistance behavior relative to the protocols AODV and LAR. For future work, 
we'll evaluate the performance of these protocols on other performance metrics, including jitter and overhead 
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